“We always monitor the flow of information, intelligence, threat streams to see whether we have any indication there’s some imminent. We work hard to identify potential cells and disrupt them. This is one of the reasons we put so much emphasis on intelligence gathering.” — Michael Chertoff
The usual calm night of the ever peaceful Zike community of Plateau State was interrupted, on the night between 13th and 14th of April 2025, by the cracking sounds of gun shots from armed men that suddenly attacked the area. The attack resulted in over 50 persons dead, while others were injured and several people displaced. Some people of the community, according to a report by the HumanAngle, opined that “the attack could have been prevented, as they received warnings of an impending attack and notified security.” Although the report did not mention how and which agency the report was given, it further cited, “limited firepower, the rough terrain of the area, and the fact that Zike had never been attacked before as the cause of the inaction.” While the aforementioned claims were not verified, the recent incidents of attacks by armed groups in the Northeast and North-central call for an appraisal of the capacity of the Nigerian security services.
Is there anything like “limited firepower” as allegedly claimed in the incident of Zike community? We have often been inundated on the media by different government officials, security analysts and private citizens that terrorists or bandits are better equipped than the country’s security services. How true can this claim be? How is it possible that a non state actor within Nigeria, regardless of all possible external support, is better equipped than the Armed Forces and the Police of the country? Anybody who is in the business or has the most minute understanding of defence procurement, will understand the enormous efforts needed to source, procure and ship military hardware. Nigeria’s efforts at procuring the Super Tucano aircraft among others is a typical example. While it is feasible to smuggle rifles and medium caliber guns into a country, it is more difficult to do same for armored fighting vehicles and other force multipliers. What we have been witnessing, is the play out of typical asymmetric warfare, in which, an inferior force takes on a superior force with profound success. This is possible because the inferior force (which in our case refers to terrorists, bandits, etc) retains initiative by selecting a target (most often ‘soft’), and the time, as well as how of their hostile action. This way, they can concentrate all their capabilities on one front, while minimizing wastage by not deploying in areas that will not see action at the time. This singular action conforms with the principles of war, that is, “concentration of forces” and economy of efforts”. This adversarial strategy works because the superior force, most often remains in the defensive mode, thereby ceding initiative to the adversaries. Therefore, government forces are confronted with a lot of uncertainties on adversarial actions, and this tends to minimize their effectiveness and efficiency, by deploying thinly across several places.
Thomas Fingar, a former Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council and Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, summarized in his book titled “Reducing Uncertainty”, that the US government spends billions of dollars every year for the Intelligence Community to reduce uncertainties. The same is true for Nigeria, albeit within the limit of our national purse, as evident in the fund allocation in our national budget. However, a major concern is what we understand as a reduction of uncertainty. Taking the Zike incident as a case, the resident alleged that they had prior information of an impending attack and they allegedly informed the security services. If this were to be true, one would have expected that the security agencies, so informed, to interdict the attackers even before they initiated the attack. However, one might need to ask if the information provided included specific details, such as, who was planning the attack, what type of attack, when and where as well as how (the famous 4W&H)? In my not so long, but long years of observing similar trends, I have discovered that such information (often referred to as intelligence), are usually speculative and lacking the ingredients for a successful interdiction, thus the information does not reduce the big ‘uncertainty’. Security responses often seen are defensive measures such as increase in checkpoints and presence of security operatives on the roads, in a manner that demonstrates the proverbial search for a pin in haystack of pins. My point here is that, reducing the level of uncertainty requires that every information is distilled to the level of the 4W&H, in such a way that the responding services can disrupt the attack before it even commences. To put it in a more succinct context, action can only be taken through knowledge and this knowledge is only obtainable through intelligence (in security parlance; actionable intelligence). Anything short of this in asymmetric warfare, will tilt the balance in favour of the inferior forces.
In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that, judging with the recent spike in similar attacks, we need to reappraise our national intelligence activities towards improving the capacity to ‘reduce the uncertainties’ to ensure the safety and security of Nigerians. Time and space will not permit me to dwell much on this, however, the people that attack are not spirits; they have associates, families and friends; they purchase sundry supplies; they move; and are known by people. They can be likened to the proverbial elephant and blind men, with each man having different knowledge of parts of the elephant, but cannot individually provide its accurate total picture. The Nigerian security and intelligence agencies/services are blessed with many brilliant and experienced minds to the extent that, making out the accurate picture of this ‘elephant’ is possible.
God bless Nigeria.
Mr Famadewa, is a retired Major General of the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps and PhD candidate of Leadership with reference to Security at King’s College, London
