Tony Blair Institute for Global Change warned Nigeria against mistaking factional disputes and leadership changes within Boko Haram as a sign of weakness.
The institute revealed this in its latest report titled “Violent Extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons From the Rise of Boko Haram,” published on Friday.
The report said it would be counterproductive for authorities in Nigeria to see factional disputes and changes in leadership within the terror group as signs of ‘operational crises’ and weakness,
noting that global jihadi factions were prone to splintering and operational divergence.
It explained that while Boko Haram currently operated as three distinct factions – ISWAP, Jamatu Ahli Al-. Sunna lil Da’wa Wal Jihad (JAS) and Jamāʿatu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān (Ansaru) – they were still inherently the same.
Boko Haram started its operations with cash donations from members and non-members in local communities.
Boko Haram, founded by the late Mohammed Yusuf, emerged in the early 2000s in Maiduguri, Borno State, with a call for the introduction of the Shari’a Law, the Islamic legal code.
The group launched its first violent operations on July 26, 2009, when it attacked several police stations across northern Nigeria, which later culminated in ended with the death of hundreds of its members, including its founder.
Surviving members under a new leadership, Abubakar Shekau, later launched fresh operations that prove to be far more sophisticated and lethal.
The report observed that in addition to regular financial contributions from members during Friday services and daily prayers, individuals from the community – within Lake Chad, including those who were not official Boko Haram affiliates, also donated to the organisation – driven by their desire to aid “the cause of Allah,”
“Boko Haram was able to expand its preaching activities using these funds, namely by building mosques, purchasing vehicles and audio equipment, and completing major property transactions.”
When Boko Haram started to move towards violence, it used donations and contributions to purchase weaponry in the early days of the insurgency, and the income from donations eventually became a vital source of sustainability as the group diversified its operations and expanded its territorial footprint, the report added.
The report further found that low literacy rates and education gaps served as both tools and opportunities for Boko Haram in its quest to recruit new members.
Boko Haram’s founders and leaders had methodically exploited their ethnic Kanuri lineages, and as a result, Kanuris remained Boko Haram’s biggest victims, the report said.
The report further also found that Boko Haram’s alliances with al-Qaeda and with ISIS in 2009 and 2015 respectively, produced material, logistical and financial support as well as capacity-building benefits that elevated the group’s operations and standing.
It added that the alliance between the homegrown terror group and the global terror networks was more or less mutually beneficial.
The report said cutting off international support would not necessarily weaken Boko Haram as the group’s major sources of funding remained local, with revenue coming from farming, fishing and logging or raids on communities in order to secure cattle, food, medicine and taxation from residents.
“The goal of establishing an Islamic State in Nigeria, and across the Lake Chad Basin, is ideologically ingrained in each faction. Despite differences that have since led to infighting and splintering, the factions remain united by the core, foundational message of their founders,” the report concluded.
